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Abstract
There is a wealth of information, hype around, and research into blockchain’s ‘disruptive’ and ‘transformative’ potential 
concerning every industry. However, there is an absence of scholarly attention given to identifying and analyzing the political 
premises and consequences of blockchain projects. Through digital ethnography and participatory action research, this article 
shows how blockchain experiments personify ‘prefigurative politics’ by design: they embody the politics and power structures 
which they want to enable in society. By showing how these prefigurative embodiments are informed and determined by 
the underlying political imaginaries, the article proposes a basic typology of blockchain projects. Furthermore, it outlines a 
frame to question, cluster, and analyze the expressions of political imaginaries intrinsic to the design and operationalization 
of blockchain projects on three analytic levels: users, intermediaries, and institutions.
Keywords Blockchain · Political imaginaries · Prefigurative politics · Decentralization · Technopolitics
Introduction: why question the political 
imaginaries under‑pinning technical 
infrastructures?
Until 2013, much excitement revolved around Bitcoin, the 
Cryptocurrency (CC) which introduced online distributed 
ledgers to the world; from then on, attention shifted to the 
vast potential applications of the ledger itself, popularly 
referred to as blockchain.1 Academic studies, popular and 
social media, slack and GitHub forums, MeetUps, Ted Talks, 
blogs, conference keynotes, and white papers surrounding 
blockchain variously show the vast diversity of opinions, 
visions, and prescriptions surrounding the technology. Eve-
rything within a spectrum from blockchain as having “the 
potential for reconfiguring all human activity” (Swan 2015, 
p. viii) to it being a “useless” technology and a scam (Aslam 
2018) can be found effortlessly. To add to this, the hype sur-
rounding blockchain’s transformative or disruptive potential 
is fueled by a diversity of actors; including technologists, 
governments, businesses, banks, start-up entrepreneurs, cod-
ers, hackers, anarchists, ecologists, and international organi-
zations—all of whom are experimenting with the technol-
ogy for different purposes. Hence, the starting point of this 
article is the scholarly and pragmatic need for navigating the 
widely prevalent techno-utopianism and techno-cynicism on 
the topic.
Put simply, blockchain is a shared cryptographic register. 
It records transactions between two parties in a permanent 
and verifiable manner without the need for any intermediary 
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or central authority. Though blockchains themselves can be 
seen as a development that drew from and combined many 
existing technologies (Campbell-Verduyn 2017), in this 
article, we situate them as the meeting point of two his-
torical trajectories: the ledger (Peters and Panayi 2016) and 
the Internet. We mention this to elucidate a simple point: 
the historical evolution of any general-purpose technology 
like the ledger, or the Internet, comes with diverse sets of 
political under-pinnings, or political imaginaries (McBride 
2006; Nowotny 2014, p. 17), that play out in many differ-
ent ways—some more dominant than others. For instance, 
amongst other developments, the ledger enabled the forma-
tion of a credit system to speed up the exchange of goods and 
services, which defined the expansion of power and wealth 
in societies (Gleeson-White 2011). The Internet decentral-
ized communication and knowledge by creating networks 
of computers that would enable people to send information 
directly to each other (Gupta 2017; Tabora 2018). While 
the Internet has been used for raising awareness about and 
organizing around global issues like climate change and 
poverty, it has also been used by the behemoths of transna-
tional banking to create debt and associated financial crises. 
Groups with different political imaginaries make and use 
technology in different ways.
In this article, a political imaginary is conceptualized as 
“a collective structure that organizes the imagination and the 
symbolism of the political, and therefore, organizes the insti-
tuting process of the political as well” (Browne and Diehl 
2019, p. 394). This definition follows from Taylor’s work 
on social imaginaries, expounding how our shared political, 
economic, and social practices are framed by an exercise in 
collective imagining regarding their purpose and relevance. 
This exercise creates a “common understanding that makes 
possible common practices and a widely shared sense of 
legitimacy” (Taylor 2004, p. 23). According to some, the 
political is changing shape, and being determined by hybrid 
combinations of old ideologies (Grant 2014; Nowotny 2014; 
Wilson and Swyngedouw 2015) and leading to a loss of 
political agency and repression of the political (Mouffe 
2005; Beveridge and Koch 2017). Furthermore, there are 
emerging technologies like blockchain enabling new forms 
of political experiences—both online and offline—influenc-
ing the collective imagination of the political. Considering 
the dramatic changes to the nature of the political itself, the 
traditional concepts from political science, sociology, and 
related disciplines “have difficulty in explaining how the 
political is constituted” (Browne and Diehl 2019, p. 393), 
let alone incorporating an analysis of techno-political inno-
vations like blockchain.
To that end, we show how blockchain projects personify 
‘prefigurative politics’2 by design—the idea that their techni-
cal and organizational forms, to a large extent, embody the 
political imaginaries and power structures which they want 
to enable in society. Generally, the themes of decentraliza-
tion of power, disintermediation from longstanding interme-
diaries like government and banks, and cryptographically 
enhanced transparency, dominate the blockchain discourse 
(Tapscott and Tapscott 2016). In spite of the inherently 
political nature of these technologies, most of the early 
studies largely evaded discussing the broader, longer term 
socio-political implications that various projects would have 
on society, governance, and politics (Atzori 2015). Legal 
scholarship “detailed the varied manners in which Bitcoin, 
CCs, and blockchains fit within existing formal laws and 
regulations often loses sight of the wider governance impli-
cations” (Campbell-Verduyn 2017, p. 4).3 Computer science 
studies focused on experimenting with different technical 
infrastructures and features (Herbert and Litchfield 2015; 
Huckle et al. 2016; Liang et al. 2017). Economists fixated 
their analyses on cryptocurrencies, cost efficiencies, initial 
coin offerings (ICOs), and their progress (O’Dwyer 2015; 
Böhme et al. 2015; Catalini and Gans 2016; Conley 2017). 
While there are a number of recently published overviews 
highlighting various research directions required in the field 
(Risius and Spohrer 2017; White 2017; Ferreira et al. 2019; 
Casino et al. 2019; Mackey et al. 2019; Treiblmaier 2019; 
Tang et al. 2019; Lu 2019), excluding a handful of studies,4 
in-depth research about the political consequences of block-
chain projects is absent to date.
In response to this state-of-play in the blockchain research 
space, this paper aims to advance a clear agenda for further 
research politicizing the imaginaries underlying a range of 
blockchain projects. We assert that analyzing the political 
imaginaries of the so-called ‘game-changing’, general-pur-
pose technologies are vital, since it determines the types 
of socio-economic and political actions that can emerge 
from, within, or on these interfaces. Exercises and debates 
in political imagination of emerging techno-political systems 
will thus, not only help us identify and cluster the political 
2 According to Graeber, “the idea that the organizational form that 
an activist group takes should embody the kind of society we wish to 
create” Explanation has been adapted from: (Graeber 2013, p. 23) For 
more information of prefigurative politics/prefiguration, please refer 
to (Murray 2014; Scott 2015; Yates 2015; Baker 2016; Gordon 2018).
3 The citation comprises of the following additional references: 
(Middlebrook and Hughes 2013; Farmer 2014; Bollen 2016).
4 Indeed, this is not an exhaustive list of citations—but scholarly lit-
erature in development and social impact studies take another stance 
mostly conceptualizing how a particular project could (often hypo-
thetically) enable a fairer society (Atzori 2015; De Filippi and Love-
luck 2016; Campbell-Verduyn 2017; Herian 2018).
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trends of current projects, but also develop normative argu-
ments for and against design features of future projects. In 
other words, it is only this sort of rigorous political analysis 
that could potentially open up blockchain projects, as well as 
other techno-political innovations to other, alternative imagi-
nations. Furthermore, we follow many others in taking the 
stance that technology is neither neutral nor apolitical in its 
technical design or socio-economic implementation (Strate 
2012; Scott 2015). On the contrary, we attempt to show how 
blockchain projects contain different in-built features of 
access, decision-making, and value—all of which influence 
power relations between individuals and communities. The 
main intention of this paper is to provide a starting point to 
identify, cluster, and analyze the underlying political imagi-
naries of blockchain projects and set up a corresponding 
research agenda to stimulate further inquiry. It does so by 
creating a basic typology of blockchain projects (Table 1), 
as well as a frame (Table 2) through which the expressions 
of project-specific political imaginaries can be analyzed. We 
advocate a more collaborative approach to designing and 
conceptualizing these technologies, where academics, tech-
nologists, policymakers, and lawyers work together. Consid-
ering the wealth, diversity, and speed at which blockchain 
initiatives are being created, we emphasize the urgency of 
articulating a broader, more multidisciplinary approach that 
rigorously questions the possible political implications.
The article proceeds as follows. Having foregrounded the 
idea of imaginaries and their prefigurative embodiments, 
we supplement the analytical frame by drawing on concepts 
from transition theory and critical geography. After propos-
ing a basic typology of four basic clusters of projects based 
on their political imaginaries, we reflect on the tensions, 
myths, and pathologies surrounding blockchain’s oft-cited 
design principles and how to approach them from a political 
imaginary perspective. We then advance a preliminary frame 
which identifies expressions and implications of political 
imaginaries on three analytic levels; users, intermediaries, 
and institutions.
Framing the issue: transformation, creative 
destruction, and prefigurative politics
To understand how to open up blockchain projects to other 
political imaginations, we must also conceptualize our 
agency and control over technological evolution. Framed 
differently, to what extent do the technologies themselves 
shape their evolution through path-dependent technologi-
cal logic? (Dafoe 2015, p. 1048). Until the 1980s, a widely 
accepted stance was that technological evolutions is an 
autonomous history-shaping process (Carpenter and Winner 
1978). It followed an internal logic and progression, which 
had a life of its own and premised societal structures without Ta
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human intentionality (Kelly 2010). Even though this sort 
of technological determinism was dismissed by subsequent 
constructivist claims which highlighted the role of social 
groups, contexts, and other perceptions of meaning (Hackett 
et al. 2008; Lynch 2008; Kline 2015), the corresponding 
“effects and autonomy of technology are neglected” (Dafoe 
2015, p. 1049). This neglection, in turn, shows up in the 
widely prevalent polarized perspectives in the blockchain 
space in general: techno-utopianism (Tapscott and Tap-
scott 2016; Kshetri 2017; Radziwill 2018; Brody 2019) and 
techno-cynicism (De Filippi and Loveluck 2016; Golum-
bia 2016; Ian Bogost 2017; Volmar 2017; Roubini 2018). It 
also shows up in the lack of frames understand the potential 
socio-politically transformative effect technology (in this 
case, blockchain projects) has on society.
Though most books and studies on blockchain often refer 
to its transformative or disruptive potential (Tapscott and Tap-
scott 2016; Radziwill 2018; Saberi et al. 2018a), there is little 
understanding of what that actually implies from a political 
point of view (Atzori 2018). Without identifying and concep-
tualizing this potential with regards to our agency, it is impos-
sible to open up techno-political evolution to achieving any 
transformation that leads to a more equitable political system. 
This involves asking questions such as: are the imaginaries 
informing blockchain open or flexible enough to be changed?; 
How ‘active’ was the construction of these imaginaries in the 
initial instance?; do blockchain practitioners consciously real-
ize the political imaginaries their tech embodies? In the fol-
lowing, these questions help open up and guide the research 
agenda about political imaginaries and their embodiment in 
blockchain projects. However, we acknowledge that choos-
ing concepts to frame the discussion is in itself a normative 
exercise and leads to some implicit prioritization of types of 
transformation. The concepts and frameworks below were 
chosen on the basis of their ability to help critically explain 
the construction and practice of techno-political transforma-
tion to create a more equitable system of politics.
Swartz (2016) identifies two types of blockchain projects: 
radical and incorporative. Simply put, radical projects are 
oriented towards revolutionary social, economic, and politi-
cal changes through imagining a new techno-political order. 
These systems enable users to circumvent the dominant 
institutional setting—central governments, banks, and cor-
porations—by creating new ones. Contrastingly, incorpora-
tive projects innovate within the existing techno-political 
system not (necessarily) aiming for a reconstruction of the 
underlying political and social premises, but instead provid-
ing, for instance, more transparency and autonomy (Swartz 
2016, pp. 86–87). As she clarifies, “the distinction…is 
not clearly defined and, in practice, there is a continuum 
between the two ideological modes” (Swartz 2016, p. 87). 
Often, we see how many radical start-ups which begin with 
“utopian visions might ‘pivot’ (to use industry parlance) 
towards business models different from or even in opposi-
tion to their original goals” (Swartz 2016, p. 88).
The point Swartz raises should not be understated; being 
from the radical camp does not ineludibly imply being 
radically more egalitarian or just. Calls for ‘transition’ and 
‘transformation’ through blockchain resonate with both 
camps, where projects often advertise themselves as address-
ing problems in areas including energy (Sivaram 2018), 
land-registry (Kshetri 2017), identity (Jacobovitz 2016), and 
governance services (Drucker 2017). Though often there is 
an apt articulation of the complex internal governance of a 
project, we will see that the conceptualizations of the politi-
cal aims and power dynamics within a broader geopoliti-
cal context are severely lacking (Markey-Towler 2018). As 
Hölscher et al. (2018) explain, both concepts, transition and 
transformation, “refer to change in complex adaptive sys-
tems [but are] often employed to different system foci. This 
has implications on what elements of change are analyzed” 
(Hölscher et al. 2018, p. 2).
Conceptually, the term ‘transition’ is predominantly 
employed to analyze changes in society subsystems like 
energy and mobility, focusing on “social, technological and 
institutional interactions” (Loorbach et al. 2017). In con-
trast, ‘transformation’ is more commonly used to reflect 
on “large-scale changes in whole societies, which can be 
global national or local” (Hölscher et al. 2018, p. 2). In this 
regard, radical blockchain projects could simply be transi-
tional, where no large-scale societal change is construed, 
but rather a subsystem with different political premises is 
imagined and hoped to replace its mainstream counterpart. 
Similarly, an incorporative project could be thought of as 
more transformational, because it changes a broader soci-
etal process. Both concepts help us to delineate the various 
system foci, which in turn will enable us to understand the 
political imaginations behind them.
While many blockchain projects may look transforma-
tive or transitional at first, they could also be ‘creatively 
destructive’, to use Harvey’s (1990) vocabulary. To under-
stand this phrase, it is necessary to highlight his concept of 
“time–space compression” (Harvey 1990, p. 240). In sum, 
time–space compression refers to the way which the accel-
eration of economic activities and global interconnectedness 
leads to the destruction of spatial barriers and distances. 
For Harvey, “creative destruction is embedded within the 
circulation of capital itself” (Harvey 1990, pp. 105–6), and 
thus, refers to industries and jobs that are made redundant 
as a result of increasing global connectedness. As an illus-
tration, we can look at how the Internet made hundreds of 
activities associated with publishing, retail, music, and travel 
completely redundant (Karr 2015). Both radical and incor-
porative blockchain projects could be thought of as a new 
vehicle expediting time–space compression, where ‘anything 
of value’ or any form of capital can be transferred globally 
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much faster, more efficiently, and in a more decentralized 
manner than previously imagined. Hence, theoretically 
speaking, both incorporative and radical projects could be 
simply updating the infrastructure of global trade, finance, 
business, and government. In that, rather than resolving the 
inherent contradictions and inequalities of our politico-eco-
nomic system, as they are often poised to, could both types 
of blockchain projects rather just be “moving them around 
geographically”? (Harvey 2010).
Regardless of how transformative blockchain projects may 
be, most of them articulate, if not embody, some form of pre-
figurative politics—“a normative vision of an imagined future 
reality rather than a description of an actual reality” (Scott 
2015). That is, they prefiguratively embody the politics and 
power structures which they are aiming for. Scott’s (2015) 
concept of the “Techno-Leviathan” adequately expresses a 
starting point to understanding this approach: “technological 
infrastructures do not offer an escape from government, they 
just offer another, competing, governance system with its 
own power dynamics”. We can choose to view rule by code 
or algorithms as positive or negative, but we must perceive 
the power in-built into the usage of a system (Scott 2015). 
With regards to governance within and through blockchain, 
projects often feature the technology’s “design principles” 
(Tapscott and Tapscott 2016) such as access, disintermedia-
tion, decentralization, empowerment, and equality. Our inter-
est here is in how these principles embody socio-political 
structures differently in different projects, depending on their 
underlying political imaginaries. For instance, ‘if a financial 
system is no longer governed and regulated by the state (i.e. 
it is disintermediated), how does the replacement governance 
system distribute power and create value?’ (Table 2).
Through the analysis of patterns through active partici-
pation in the blockchain space, journal reflections at events 
and literature review (which is expounded upon in the next 
section), we construct a basic typology of blockchain pro-
jects (Table 1) into four clusters based on their imaginaries: 
(i) crypto-libertarians, (ii) crypto-commonists,5 (iii) crypto-
governmentalists, and (iv) crypto-collaborativists.
We can distinguish the first two from the latter two 
quite easily because of one simple reason: the first two 
are parallel projects attempting to create very different 
worlds, i.e., blockchain as government. Even then, each 
one of the clusters conceptualizes their imaginaries differ-
ently and, hence, enables a different types of socio-polit-
ical processes and transformations. The first two both fall 
under the larger umbrella of crypto-anarchists (Peyrouzet 
García-Siñeriz 2018, p. 7), while the latter two fall under 
the banner of crypto-institutionalists. While both the crypto-
anarchists aim for detachment from the state, the former, 
crypto-libertarians, is unique for its individualistic mar-
ket-oriented approach to both economic organization and 
mode of governance (Golumbia 2016). The latter, crypto-
commonists, takes the collectivist approach as advocated 
by commons activists, and, hence, a collaborative approach 
to governance (Bauwens 2018; Adams 2019). Amongst the 
crypto-institutionalists, crypto-governmentalists are usu-
ally governmental agencies (national or city) who aim to 
improve government’s efficiency, transparency, account-
ability, and security using blockchain (Hancock and Vaizey 
2015; Ølnes et al. 2017). Such projects take the approach of 
using blockchain in government. Crypto-collaborativists are 
those public–private partnerships or coalitions that aim to 
collaboratively experiment with blockchain experiment with 
the existing political infrastructure as well as create new 
ones. This is the group that either designs projects for gov-
ernment or in collaboration with government. While these 
clusters are not fixed, they begin to shed light on the prefigu-
rative element of the political imaginaries of these projects.
To highlight the importance of identifying and analyzing 
these imaginaries, we assert that “technological opportu-
nities do not enter into economic and social life without 
deliberate efforts and choices” (Archibugi 2017, p. 541). 
We oppose our frame to Marxian and Deweyan techno-
determinism (Smith and Marx 1994), which considers social 
relations, organizational structures, and cultural practices 
predominantly a product of a society’s techno-economic 
infrastructure. Since possible socio-political scenarios will 
perpetuate the mainstream only with deliberate use, identi-
fication of the imaginaries becomes even more important, 
because our efforts and choices of designing and using par-
ticular systems will enable particular socio-political realities.
After outlining our methodology, we critically analyze 
the most cited and popularly misconceived design principles 
of blockchain projects, and follow with a discussion and 
research agenda.6
Methods: digital ethnography 
and immersion in social worlds
This article is principally an outcome of the first author 
being immersed in the blockchain space for the past 3 years 
in Europe—primarily in the Netherlands and the UK. The 
methodological approach was predominantly inspired by the 
iterative principles of digital ethnography (Pink et al. 2016; 
5 Neologism first proposed by Peyrouzet García-Siñeriz (2018).
6 In this article, we make a distinction between blockchain platforms 
like Ethereum or EOS and projects like Status or Augur. However, we 
also acknowledge that this is not a strict distinction, since ‘projects’ 
like Colu or Bancor, allow currencies and projects to emerge from 
within them. Platforms, projects, and hybrids, indeed have political 
imaginaries at play, but we confine ourselves to discussing projects in 
this article for conceptual clarity.
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Hjorth 2017; Hsu 2017) and supplemented with participa-
tory action and qualitative methods used in social sciences 
(Bergold and Thomas 2012). Digital ethnography begins 
with the idea that the “digital has become a part of the mate-
rial, sensory and social worlds that we inhabit” (Pink et al. 
2016, p. 7) and, hence, must be an integral feature in most 
forms of ethnographic research. Furthermore, this approach 
helps takes notice of how the digital is increasing, reducing, 
and transforming our socio-political life and agency in our 
social worlds. The social world7 that blockchain innovation 
takes place is neither solely online or offline, and, hence, 
needs to be treated as such during empirical research. Since 
each social-political world comes with its own variety of 
communication norms, rules, networks, behaviors, activity 
infrastructures, and operational structures, an ethnographer 
has to learn the language and energy of the world to begin 
understanding it. As Pink et al. confirm, “immersion, par-
ticipant observation and ‘the everyday’ are three ideas bound 
up with how we study social worlds” (Pink et al. 2016, p. 
436). This form of ethnography is a reflexive methodology 
that allows researchers to develop individualized approaches 
for each environment and is the most appropriate tool for 
understanding online environments (Ward 1999).
To do research within the social worlds of blockchain 
projects, activities included participant observation to ana-
lyze the issues raised and debates carried out at monthly 
blockchain MeetUps for a year in Amsterdam (12); online 
and offline hackathons annually (2 hackathons); weekly 
presence in Slack teams and other team collaboration plat-
forms8 (6 teams); and other online forums like Reddit (4 
forums regularly); attendance at blockchain conferences (4 
European conferences), online seminars (3 seminars) and 
after-parties; and conference calls with project leads and 
entrepreneurs; analysis of data from, wikis and blogs pro-
duced by respondents, as well as online focus groups. The 
offline involvement at events allowed many opportunities for 
discussions and informal interviews with ICO heads, expert 
practitioners, blockchain figureheads, government officials, 
coders, researchers, experts, and activists (25). However, 
considering the briefness and casual setting unsuitable for 
audio recording, most conversations were recounted as 
non-verbatim journal reflections. The online data collection 
comprised of a daily and weekly routine of: reading already 
joined threads and channels, contributing to debates, virtu-
ally archiving notes, taking field notes, and placing them 
in hand-made cross-reference diagrams. Furthermore, the 
choice of which blockchain projects to analyze was driven 
by the research process itself, where projects were rec-
ommended or discussed during the immersion activities. 
However, it should be noted that projects were deliberately 
chosen across the political spectrum after the basic typolo-
gies were observed—from crypto-anarchists to crypto-insti-
tutionalists (which had very different social worlds9)—in 
search for outliers and differentiating data.
The evidence and insight acquired through the above 
method of immersion is used in concert with several other 
sources of secondary data, including academic studies, 
White Papers,10 cryptocurrency and technology blogs, news 
websites, and popular media. Considering the nature of the 
study—to identify and analyze the political premises of block-
chain projects—these sources have been used as primary data, 
since they are often the only articulation of the political imagi-
naries. We used these documents to tease out the political 
imaginations in the author bias, ethics disclaimers, and vision 
statements, and place them in cross-reference diagrams. Many 
of the non-academic sources which were consulted remain in 
the basement of the internet, which is not only hard to find, but 
dominated by groups which prefer to remain detached from 
popular media. Conversely, in our scholarly literature review, 
we noted that many articles concerning blockchain cite the 
popular news websites like CoinDesk and CoinTelegraph, as 
well as blogs and forums like Hacker Noon and subreddits 
like r/Blockchain/. Indeed, as the Misfit Economy points out, 
activities in the grey area between ‘deviance’ and the ‘normal’ 
are often the cradles of innovation (Clay and Phillips 2015). 
Furthermore, they offer us a way to ‘reinvent the wheel’—cre-
ate new alternative systems that at least initially operate out-
side the dominant institutional setting. Homero Gil de Zúñiga 
et al. (2010) reiterate these points that we need to take into 
account “a new type of political advocate” (p. 36) who are 
“increasingly relevant to political discourse…[who] evidence 
of the emergence of a hybrid participation that combines the 
7 Understood as “a form of social organization which cannot be accu-
rately delineated by spatial, territorial, formal or membership bounda-
ries” (Unruh 1980, p. 271). Applied to the hybrid space of online and 
offline interactions socio-political worlds are construed as “relatively 
unbounded…domains of social life”, where ethnographers immerse 
themselves with research participants for long periods of time (Pink 
et al. 2016, p. 434).
8 Team collaboration platforms or team communication platforms 
(TCPs) have are an “are an emergent class of social collabora-
tion technology that combine features of multiple enterprise social 
media including social networking platforms and instant messaging” 
(Anders 2016, p. 224).
9 Crypto-anarchists projects were usually global, translocal, or local 
projects, which involved a lot of online collaboration. Contrastingly, 
crypto-institutionalists were almost always national, regional or local 
projects which required many traditional techniques such as inter-
views and workshops.
10 “A white paper is a document which includes an outline of a prob-
lem that the project is looking to solve, the solution to that problem 
as well as a detailed description of their product, its architecture and 
its interaction with users”. For more info, refer to: (CoinTelegraph 
2018). Examples of the white papers of projects include all projects 
listed in Table 1.
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virtual and real world realms of political engagement and 
action” (Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2010, p. 45).
Both online and offline sources of information were cross-
validated though an iterative form of pattern analysis. This 
analysis comprised of identifying patterns that emerged in 
how the themes (highlighted in the next section) were con-
ceptualized in different blockchain projects. Hence, the pat-
tern markers were found in the various data sources outlined 
above and subsequently clustered, as shown in Table 1. As 
noted, there was no fixed criteria with which to cluster the 
projects. Instead, it evolved over the course of the research. 
These criteria are reflected in the first column of Table 1. It 
is this evolution through the analysis of patterns and cross-
validation with experts and academic analyses that led to the 
outlining the questions and prefigurative political expres-
sions of blockchain projects in Table 2.
Results: rethinking blockchain’s design 
principles—equitable design ≠ equitable 
politics
Blockchain is often cited as a panacea for many sectors of 
the digitally enabled economy (Kshetri 2017), and as infra-
structure for a variety of public services (Killmeyer et al. 
2017), including land registry (Oprunenco and Akmeemana 
2018), healthcare, recycling (Saberi et al. 2018b), and many 
more (Vigna and Casey 2016). However, the political moti-
vations behind these projects are seldom questioned.11 Cryp-
tocurrencies, one particular set of use cases of blockchains, 
have been closely associated with a libertarian ideology, but 
these are underdeveloped conceptualizations at best (Faife 
2016). For instance, libertarians could be statists, advocat-
ing a limited government; or anarcho-capitalists and cyber-
libertarians, who would like to hand over all power to the 
markets. In CoinDesk’s Q2 2018 survey of 1200 crypto-
community respondents, they concluded that 52% was dis-
tinctively right-wing, while 45% was leaning towards the left 
(CoinDesk 2018, pp. 105–106). While these statistics are 
enlightening for a superficial understanding of the crypto-
currency field, they reflect the political inclinations of those 
who are active users of cryptocurrencies, rather than those 
individuals creating blockchain-based projects. In contrast, 
our aim is to understand the political premises that inform 
the design of the projects themselves, rather than their users. 
More specifically, through asking a series of questions, we 
seek to be able identify the clusters of projects and better 
predict the associated socio-political implications.
In the following section, we use published scholarly 
research and insight from non-academic sources in concert 
with reflections, cross-validating interviews with experts and 
patterns identified during the ethnography. The analysis will 
be used to formulate fundamental questions about the political 
imaginaries and their prefigurative political expressions. The 
themes listed below were the most popular, yet, often repeti-
tively misconceived features of blockchain projects identified 
during the course of the first author’s empirical research. The 
questions formulated are considered fundamental owing to: 
the fact that each project researched has cited the miscon-
ceived terms; they determine the basic functioning and design 
of the project; expert interviewees considered them as fun-
damental in defining the expressions of political imaginaries 
of blockchain projects. The themes lay the groundwork, in 
terms of conceptualization, to ask specific questions regarding 
the four clusters of expressions outlined in Table 2: political 
imaginaries, nature of transformative potential, prefigurative 
political design, and incentives and values.
Decentralization and disintermediation
Perhaps, the most glorified characteristics of blockchain 
are its capacity to decentralize and disintermediate. These 
closely related concepts and often conflated features are 
appealed to by all initiatives. With blockchain, every node 
in a network retains a copy of all transactions that are carried 
out on a system, effectively eliminating the need for a third-
party intermediary like payment processors, banks, and even 
governments. The decentralization of the nodes allows for 
disintermediation, but does not necessitate it. For instance, 
disintermediating from centralized institutions could be car-
ried out through a peer-to-peer (P2P) protocol which allows 
two parties to transact without an intermediary. A cryptocur-
rency—such as Bitcoin—would be one such example: an 
electronic cash system which allows peers to transact tokens 
without any middleman writing the terms of transaction. 
Bitcoin can decentralize transaction data, make it transparent 
in a public ledger, and replace the traditional financial inter-
mediaries. Each transaction is instead validated by miners (a 
group of volunteers) who compete to solve a mathematical 
puzzle to gain a small reward. However, it has, nonethe-
less, created an alternative governance system which has 
recentralizing tendencies in the form of “colossal mining 
operations…with risks of collusion or cartelization” (Atzori 
2015, p. 16). As Dodd explains, Bitcoin’s “social life” is 
characterized by asymmetries of wealth and power that are 
not dissimilar from the mainstream financial system” (Dodd 
2018, p. 35). This raised several questions for our empirical 
research, such as: once we remove traditional central author-
ities, who does our blockchain-based system give power to? 
Which actors are most likely to become more powerful as 
a consequence of decentralizing a particular system? Are 
11 There are some more developments particularly in the field of 
cryptocurrencies such as: (Golumbia 2016).
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there, or could we create cryptocurrencies with non-liber-
tarian imaginaries? Such questions as well as the problem-
atic understanding of decentralization influence the various 
expressions of blockchain projects identified in Table 2. For 
instance, if traditional authorities are replaced, who then sets 
the affordances and constraints for the user?
While the power relations and politics of Bitcoin have 
been addressed elsewhere (Golumbia 2015), we can ask 
similar questions about all blockchain projects. Blockchain 
projects in different sectors have different sets of actors, each 
of whom have different aims and scope. For instance, take 
the case of e-Estonia, a series of projects launched by the 
national government of Estonia to digitize the interactions 
of citizens with the state. Through our empirical work, we 
asked what does creating a “virtual, borderless, blockchained, 
and secure” (Heller 2018) government entail in terms of a 
cyber-governmentalist imaginary? Does the transparency and 
efficiency brought about by virtualizing governance services 
change arrangements of power and decision-making, or sim-
ply increase accountability and reduce chances of coercion? 
Does the decentralization of data ownership entail any dis-
intermediation from the government itself, or rather deepen 
institutional control? If we are able to conceptualize cases 
like this, we will be in a better position to understand the 
nature of the project. This includes, for example, whether it 
is incorporative or radical, the potential for time–space com-
pression and/or creative destruction, the aims, scope, and fea-
tures of transformation or transition. The aim of this article is 
provide a frame to systematically and thoroughly investigate 
such issues as is delineated in Table 2.
With regards to disintermediation in general, arguably 
one of the most important questions that emerged during 
the course of our research is which types of intermediaries 
might we want to get rid of, and why? While there are many 
projects that decentralize for the sake of decentralization, 
Schneider (2017) notes that there needs to be more nuance 
in understanding whether or not decentralizing everything 
is either feasible or makes systems more accountable. His 
point is that since many decentralized systems eventually 
show different forms of centralization, projects must be very 
specific about “the particular features of a system a given 
design seeks to decentralize”. Furthermore, he explains 
how recentralization often occurs because of “imbalances of 
power that operate outside the given network”. For instance, 
wealth in the cryptocurrency world is usually correlated to 
wealth in the external economy, as well as early adoption 
and education (Schneider 2017). To counteract these con-
centrations of power, projects can use a diversity of modes of 
decentralization, or checks and balances—each informed by 
their own political imagination. Mechanisms and software 
that decentralize complex systems can bring liberating pos-
sibilities; yet they also risk creating radically unaccountable 
and coercive concentrations of power (Atzori 2015; Reijers 
and Coeckelbergh 2016). In that, Table 2 makes an effort to 
expose the various modes and expressions of decentraliza-
tion and disintermediation implicit in blockchain projects.
As an illustration of the above point, take the case of the so-
called sharing economy initiatives such as Airbnb and Uber, 
which rely on the “contributions of users as a means to generate 
value within their own platforms” (De Filippi 2018, p. 2). These 
companies have been called tightly controlled, profit-driven 
corporate platforms which exploit their users, leading to global 
protests (Largave 2017; Lownsbroug 2017). As a response, 
some crypto-commonist initiatives are built as “platform coop-
eratives”, which are “collectively owned and governed by the 
people who depend on and participate [in them]” (Sutton et al. 
2016) deriving from a long history of cooperative economics. 
For instance, in the FairCoin Coop, all decision and strategies 
are made in monthly assemblies (König and Duran 2016). As 
such, the power relations are of a collaborative nature, with the 
politico-economic imagination behind these initiatives being 
commons-based rather than market-based. Of course, equality 
in design of a platform does not necessarily imply the same 
qualities will exist practice. A commons-based system cannot 
just be a simple bolt-on set of principles to an existing pro-
ject or business. It has to be conceived as a political choice 
and involves an entirely different starting point than a regular 
start-up. Hence, it becomes very important to consider political 
premises underlying the variations of decentralization, both at 
the design level (political imaginaries and prefigurative political 
design in Table 2) and at the implementation level (nature of 
transformative potential and incentives and values in Table 2). 
The more precisely we can delineate features of the technical 
system, the more aptly we can determine the types of socio-
economic and political interactions the system can enable.
Access, inclusion, and empowerment
Blockchain, it is claimed, has the capacity to “bank the 
unbanked” (Thellmann 2018), create a “financially inclusive 
future” (Fork 2018), “break the poverty chain in the global 
south” (Kshetri 2017, p. 1710), and “empower the poor” 
(Thomason et al. 2018, p. 138). These are some of the com-
monly made claims about blockchain. Searching similar 
phrases leads to a series of academic studies, opinion pieces, 
and actual blockchain projects which commonly cite these 
phrases. While the intent of these projects is seemingly to cre-
ate a more inclusive financial, economic, and political system, 
their diverse actualizations come with some deeply problem-
atic politics and imaginaries. First, there is the issue of access. 
For the moment, only 55% of the world has access to the Inter-
net, and this is unevenly distributed geographically (Graham 
2014; Poushter 2016; World Population Stats 2018). Since 
most blockchain projects require access to at least a smart-
phone and the Internet, it seems unlikely the technology will 
be a panacea for poverty in the entire region of the global south 
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(Kshetri 2017). Furthermore, there is an entirely different set of 
power and information asymmetries and cultures in the devel-
oping world which all need to be reckoned with in the design 
of alternative systems (Castor 2018; Kshetri and Voas 2018).
The social aspects of both the digital divide and demo-
cratic divide become increasingly relevant when different 
aspects of socio-political life are put online. As Min (2010) 
explains, the digital divide could cause “additional disad-
vantages for the already marginalized groups in society” 
(Min 2010, p. 22). The democratic divide, which concerns 
people’s different usage of the internet for political purposes, 
can be expanded to the blockchain space, by imagining peo-
ple’s differential attitudes and skills to understand what the 
system allows and disallows them from doing (Norris 2001). 
As Lubin et al. (2018) assert, expecting these diverse popu-
lations to embrace new technological systems created by 
start-ups in the blockchain world that restructure daily life 
transactions “wholesale oversimplifies the social process of 
technological system” (Lubin et al. 2018, p. 13).
During our empirical research, we found a host of inno-
vative solutions, like cheaper remittance systems (Lashkov 
2018), that will make headway in solving particular issues 
in particular places. For instance, project Bifröst works with 
a consortium of non-profit companies to help develop “cash 
transfer programs” which will use blockchain and cryptocur-
rencies to enable a new world of micro-finance and cheaper 
remittances (Bifröst 2018). However, it is hard to miss that 
the overall crypto-anarchist approach darkly resembles a vari-
ation on “authoritarian paternalism”, wherein the blockchain 
innovation community—mostly situated in North America and 
Europe—decides the best solution for the disenfranchised pop-
ulations continents away (Scott 2015). As Scott puts it, “there 
is something obnoxious about the way that university-educated 
tech optimists constantly invoke the mythical land of “Africa”, 
with the imagined African person in the imagined African 
village, using Bitcoin to escape corruption in their country” 
(Scott 2015). Take for instance Zipcoin, which is digitalizing 
the African market through a payment and remittance system 
(Zipcoin 2018; Cocking 2019). Such vision statements in 
global development rhetoric and the blockchain start-up com-
munity carry with them a political ambition of imposing tech-
centric solutions for an often non-tech adept community. Their 
political premises may be radical or incorporative in theory, 
but our interviews and experts explained how applying liber-
tarian or commonist ideals in the technical design to systems 
where the cultural and political context is not libertarian nor 
commonist is deeply problematic. Furthermore, it may actually 
worsen socio-economic inequalities in many situations.
As Lubin et al. explain, with regards to financial inclu-
sion, many projects also assume “that under-resourced 
localities define “value” in the same way as westernized 
communities do—via fiat currency—rather than by other 
quality of life measures” (Lubin et al. 2018, p. 13). The latter 
includes, for example, access to food and basic resources, 
community solidarity, social capital, or direct exchange of 
services. Hence, the “value as incentive” (Radziwill 2018, 
p. 35) that is commonly cited in the white papers of crypto-
anarchist blockchain projects may not hold, owing to differ-
ing political ambitions—both in under-resourced and devel-
oped contexts. In general, an incentive in any design element 
of a system influences the behaviors of anyone participating 
in the system (Barrera 2018). More simply, they encourage 
communities of participants to collaboratively create value, 
which, in turn, will ensure the success of their platform. 
According to this scheme, working for your self-interests 
will benefit the whole (antifragile 2017).
Most blockchain-based systems use tokenized pay-for-
performance incentive schemes in which participants are 
rewarded according to the performance of the token’s value. 
However, as Barrera (2018) aptly points out, there are many 
problems that could arise from poorly choose performance 
metrics. For example, innocuous or malicious gaming12 
could exacerbate the inequalities in communities where 
there is already inequality in terms of capital investment, 
education, expertise, and power. Furthermore, if the politico-
economic aim is the empowerment of disadvantaged people, 
we must then question whether such systems are referring to 
individual empowerment or collective empowerment—and 
whether one necessarily translates into the other. It is expres-
sions of such embodied values that the “incentives and val-
ues” column in Table 2 attempts to expose. BitPesa, which is 
the first African digital money transfer company, succeeded 
in removing correspondent banks from the transaction chain. 
However, by disintermediating cash transfers, does it nec-
essarily mean that it will be used for collective empower-
ment or reiterate local inequalities? (Yen 2017; Flore 2018). 
For instance, those who climb the steep learning curve of 
exploiting the emerging systems on the blockchain may ben-
efit far more quickly than others, creating a series of issues 
regarding accountability and the modes of decentralization 
most suited for the job.
Also, worth reflecting upon here, are the many innova-
tive blockchain projects whose political imaginations regard-
ing inclusion, access and empowerment are not yet realized; 
rather, they are currently in the process of being developed. 
For instance, RightMesh “is on a mission to connect the next 
billion users without infrastructure” [instead of laying new 
fiber optic cables for Internet connectivity, it can transform 
smartphones into nodes that form a network, and connectivity 
12 Barrera outlines three other problems: free-riding, multi-tasking 
and risk misalignment. “Innocuous Gaming: Users may take actions 
that increase token value but do not have a positive impact on the 
value of the platform”.
 “Malicious Gaming: Users may take actions that increase token 
value to the detriment of platform value.” (Barrera 2018).
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between them is achieved through Bluetooth and Wi-Fi (which 
is inherent to the device)] (RightMesh 2018). While there are 
many initiatives “banking the unbanked”, this one “retrofits 
existing mobile applications and builds new, P2P mesh appli-
cations” (RightMesh 2018). When implementing solutions 
beyond simple connectivity, RightMesh will have to be careful 
not to replicate, reiterate, or create new forms of inequalities 
through power imbalances in a system. Nonetheless, creating 
such mesh networks for context-specific solutions and working 
with local actors could create new forms of techno-political 
innovation. Another such example is Colu, a “decentralized 
payment system for local communities” (Colu Technologies 
DLT limited 2018, p. 2) upon which communities can create 
their own currencies and implement mechanisms of consensus 
and power depending on their place-based definitions of value 
and culture. Such umbrella systems using blockchain enable 
a new way of working, where place-based actors can access 
an open-source software and adapt it to their context-sensitive 
needs using a global pool of volunteers for support.
Code is law and modes of coercion
“Code is law”, another way of referring to “governance by 
technologies”, is the idea that software coding can be under-
stood as a form of law. Campbell-Verduyn (2017) explains 
that certain design features of technologies themselves can 
“reframe, redefine, and reconstitute the mundane activities 
of the social actors and social process under-pinning global 
governance” (Campbell-Verduyn 2017, p. 8). Specific archi-
tectures of general-purpose technologies, as described ear-
lier, can be understood as “arrangements of power” (DeNardis 
2012, p. 721) which weigh heavily on the conditions of pos-
sibility for socio-economic interactions. As Benkler states, the 
Internet has been coded to allow certain “affordances and con-
straints” (Benkler 2011, p. 722) around values which we may 
not be able to identify at first. Building on this idea, Filippi 
and Hassan (2018) assert that “code has progressively estab-
lished itself as the predominant way to regulate the behavior 
of Internet users”. Accordingly, with the advent of blockchain 
and associated smart contracts, code is assuming such a strong 
role, that it is possible to identify a shift from ‘code is law’ 
(code has the effect of law) to ‘law is code’ (law is actively 
being defined as code) (De Filippi and Hassan 2016).
Contextualizing this shift in terms of political imagination, 
there is a stark difference in the way which socio-economic 
interactions will be regulated. The current legal system is 
enforced “ex-post” (after the event) through state interven-
tion, while in technological systems, it is in-built in the 
system, and, hence, is enforced “ex ante” (before the event) 
through code (De Filippi and Hassan 2016). This implies 
that the designers, owners, and controllers of the system can 
choose to structurally enable and disable certain types of 
socio-economic interactions, political action, and processes 
on their technical systems. Through empirically scanning 
blockchain projects, decentralization evangelists, and techno-
utopians from both the radical and incorporative camps, we 
identified their shared claim of the possibility to reduce the 
role of coercive institutions, such as the state and other reg-
ulatory bodies, by pre-defining what is and is not allowed 
(Atzori 2015). Correspondingly, the burgeoning reliance on 
technology in this regard, signals the urgency of questioning 
and analyzing the in-built ethical-legal and political features 
of projects. If we understand that blockchain projects are 
reducing certain traditionally coercive institutions, we must 
ask which new forms of coercion emerge within blockchain 
governance systems—both internally and externally. Accord-
ing to Myers, “reproducing the coercive role of the state in 
a decentralized yet less constrained manner does not create 
a more just society” (Myers 2017, p. 246); rather, the same 
political ideals of libertarian democracy will be implemented 
in a new and debatably more coercive form.
We are already witnessing government-led pilots experi-
menting with political rule by algorithm (Calzada 2018). 
China’s social credit system is a national reputation system 
which aims to standardize the assessment of citizens’ and 
businesses’ reputations and grant rewards. Popularly refer-
enced to TV show Black Mirror (Jeferson 2018), it is being 
described in the media as a politically dystopic shift and 
another form of surveillance capitalism (Cinnamon 2017; 
Chorzempa et al. 2018). Similarly, through our research, we 
ascertained that many blockchain projects prefiguratively 
implement politicized ideas of incentives to instill certain 
types of behavior. For instance, the aforementioned exam-
ple of Colu (Joey 2018) and community cryptocurrencies 
encourage and incentivizes people to take part in the local 
economy (Birch 2015; Tarasiewicz and Newman 2015). 
The imaginaries of such a system share some similarities 
with the crypto-commonists, circular economy, and poli-
tics of local consumption (Mougayar 2016; Circle Economy 
2018). There are other exploratory ideas of creating a Co-op 
Coin which would embody principles of the collaborative 
economy and use organizational models of cooperatives 
(Sylvester-Bradley 2018). Design features are highly politi-
cized and have profound implications on the types of activity 
that can be carried out by civil society. With each project, we 
must question which values are encoded in the system, who 
controls it, which organizational structure is present to form 
consensus, and what are the political visions of the code.
Discussion: screening blockchain projects—
an exercise in political imagination
Our central claim in this paper is that blockchain experi-
ments embody the politics, i.e., affordances and constraints 
(Benkler 2011, p. 722), which they aim to enable in society. 
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This, in turn, depends on the political imaginaries on which 
the projects are built. In this section, in the spirit of setting a 
future transdisciplinary research agenda, we propose a frame 
to question, cluster, and analyze the imaginaries and their 
consequences. We do so in response to the current knowl-
edge gap. That is, in the blockchain space, there are many 
analysts and practitioners who have attempted to compare 
the types of blockchains (Grakov and Chiara 2018), design 
features of blockchain platforms (not projects) (edChain 
2018), cryptocurrencies (Desjardins 2018), and even create 
decision-trees of when to use a blockchain (World Economic 
Forum 2018; Zitter 2018). Though such tables elucidate the 
many differences between the technical features, they are 
far from a graspable comparison of the political premises 
behind them. Furthermore, it can also be noted that major-
ity of the academic analysis and consultancy reports that 
were reviewed for this article regurgitate the imaginaries of 
blockchain projects without any critical reflection. Contrast-
ingly, our aim in Table 2 is to create a broader frame which 
functions less as a table of comparisons, and more as an 
iterative framework which opens up new avenues of research 
and experimentation which can be collaboratively worked on 
by academics, practitioners, technologists, and politicians. It 
can also be used as a tool by practitioners to understand the 
political implications of their design, while also elucidating 
how implementation may pose certain difficulties.
Relevant here is the work of Risius and Spohrer, who 
delineated a “blockchain research framework” which is 
“conceptualized as an intersection of activities that block-
chain developers and users can undertake and the levels of 
analysis on which these activities wield influence” (p. 389). 
They have adapted an established framework from the social 
media research agenda of Aral et al. to identify topics and 
find connections that have not been considered by other 
blockchain research. Deriving inspiration from their work, 
we have recreated the table below which identifies topics and 
finds connections specifically with regards to expressions of 
political imaginaries, transformative potential, prefigurative 
political designs, and incentives.
We use the vocabulary and analysis from the previous 
sections in concert with our wider empirical journal reflec-
tions to construct the questions within the frame. In Table 2, 
the left-most column separates the levels of analysis: users, 
intermediaries, and institutions. At each of these levels, a 
series of (research) questions are articulated with respect 
to each “expression”. The row titled “basic” describes the 
question of the expression itself. For instance, a project’s 
“nature of transformative potential” analyzed at the level of 
the user will ask how and what exactly will change for the 
user. In other words, will it simply be an incorporative pro-
ject, where the user’s role, power, and influence will remain 
the same, or will they change in the proposed system?
This frame can be used reflexively for different purposes. 
For example: (i) a project can be analyzed from the perspec-
tive of just the user, intermediary, or institution, with regards 
to each one of the expressions in the columns. (ii) A project 
can be analyzed from all levels of analysis with regards to 
only one expression. (iii) The relationship between two or 
more expressions can be analyzed through a study or pilot. 
Though the frame is open to interpretation and use, we must 
clarify that the questions were written with the intention of 
being project-specific.
Concluding remarks: the political agency 
of research on innovation
This article has attempted to articulate a critical frame 
through which to analyze the socio-political under-pinnings 
of blockchain projects. Yet, our intention in this article is not 
to promote either blockchain utopianism or cynicism; nor is 
it to advocate for a crypto-anarchist or crypto-institutionalist 
approach. Rather, it is to articulate a call and research frame 
to delve deeper into how the political imaginaries behind 
both the technical design and implementation of projects 
prefiguratively create the infrastructure of politics. Further-
more, in contrast to many of the articles that were reviewed 
during this research, we do not make claims that blockchain 
is suited for socialist or libertarian systems. Rather, we 
simply encourage practitioners to critically and reflexively 
analyze the often underdeveloped political underpinnings 
of their projects. Indeed, it is relevant to mention how lit-
tle scholars trained in political and social sciences have 
addressed the imaginaries and corresponding implications 
mentioned in this paper. Technology is not neutral. However, 
it is only with considerable, deliberate efforts, and both indi-
vidual and collective choices that technology restructures 
and reorients our socio-economic lives.
Concerning various design features that most contem-
porary projects cite, we advocate a more thorough form of 
prototyping that could elucidate how they will play out. For 
instance, instead of decentralizing for the sake of decen-
tralizing, we suggest that it is more appropriate to first ask 
which aspects of particular systems would function better 
in a decentralized way? And for who? Would they enable a 
new form of political reality? Why would that be desirable? 
When reconfigured in this way, the “measure of a technology 
should be its capacity to engender more accountable forms 
of trust” (Schneider 2017).
To conclude, by envisaging new forms of organization, 
politics, business, and trade associated with emerging tech-
nology, we will also, to an extent, be able to guide them. In 
other words, we become better equipped to paint a picture of 
the future which we desire, considering blockchains’ capac-
ity to alter the socio-technical landscape through expediting 
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time–space compression. In the words of Vinay Gupta, we 
must “make a clear image of the future we want, otherwise 
we are going to get the kind of future that happens by acci-
dent” (Gupta 2018).
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